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THE HOLLOW PROMISE OF AN ACCOUNTING
STANDARD SETTER
ABSTRACT
Purpose – This paper applies a power framework to critically analyse the
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries.
Design/methodology/approach – Publicly available data, including comment letters,
annual reports, company websites, and IASC/IASB pronouncements, is used to make
connections between the key plays involved in the international accounting standard
setting process for the extractive industries.
Findings – Lukes’ (1974) conception of power is used to explain the community of
interests that developed between the IASC/IASB and extractive industries
constituents. This community of interests is shown to have enabled the extractive
industries to mobilise its power to paralyse the standard setting body and secure
favourable regulation. While the politicisation of accounting standard setting is
widely acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant groups can covertly
wield such power is a sobering one in the light of the worldwide promotion and
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards.
Originality/value – This paper contributes to understanding of the presence of power
in the international accounting standard setting process and how it is mobilised by key
constituents.
Key words – International accounting standards, extractive industries, power,
standard setting, financial accounting
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INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a profound
change has occurred in the way many entities, including the world’s largest public
companies, produce their general purpose financial reports. This is particularly
significant in the case of extractive industries accounting, with the International
Accounting Standards Board yet to develop a comprehensive international accounting
standard, and instead still struggling to achieve consensus among the many and varied
interests of constituents. With accounting and accounting standard setting now
accepted as being highly politicised activities, this paper provides insight into the
constituents that contribute to the process of developing an international accounting
standard for the extractive industries.
Defined as the petroleum (oil and gas) and mining industries (International
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a), the extractive industries have substantial
economic, social, political, and environmental impacts. Many of the world’s largest
extractive companies, such as the Royal Dutch/Shell group, BP, BHP Billiton, and
ExxonMobil, are well known and established household names. The economic
strength of the major extractive industries companies is such that many are richer and
more powerful than the states and even countries that seek to regulate them (Global
Policy Forum, 2006). Indeed, six of the world’s top twelve companies are from the
extractive industries, being BP, Chevron/Texaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, the
Royal Dutch/Shell group, and TOTAL (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000, Fortune
Magazine, 2005). In 2005, these six companies recorded combined revenues in
excess of US$1.2 trillion and profits of US$92 billion (Fortune Magazine, 2005).
Comparing the combined revenues of these six global companies with current United
States Gross Domestic Product of US$11 trillion (World Bank, 2005) gives some
perspective of the enormous economic strength of the major international extractive
industries companies. The political influence of this sector flows on from its
economic strength. Extractive industry coalitions have been active lobbyists in
regulatory debates concerning issues such as global climate change, taxation policy,
and sustainable development, with many, such as the American Petroleum Institute,
formed specifically for the purpose of influencing public policy and regulatory
processes for the benefit of members (American Petroleum Institute, 2006).
The environmental impacts are arguably the most visible consequence of
extractive activities. The negative environmental impacts of mining are wellpublicised, with, for example, the BHP mine in Ok Tedi, Papua New Guinea (BHP
Ltd, 1999), and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska (United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 2006), attracting substantial publicity as a result of the devastating
environmental and socio-economic impacts. In response, extractive industries
enterprises have sought to improve their corporate images, with many implementing
extensive environmental programs to monitor and ensure the environmental
sustainability of their operations.
The social impacts of the extractive industries are also significant. Major
extractive operations can be responsible for improving infrastructure in and around
the area being mined, increasing capital investment to a community and/or country,
providing employment opportunities, and boosting local economies. Indeed, many
developing countries benefit substantially from the royalty payments from mining
companies. For example, mining in Papua New Guinea accounts for approximately
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21 percent of its Gross Domestic Product and 75 percent of export earnings
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2004).
The substantial economic, political, social, and environmental impacts of the
extractive industries contribute to the accountability of this sector and make evident
the importance of the accounting practices used by extractive industries companies to
report on their financial performance and position. One aspect of extractive industries
accounting that has been plagued by controversy concerning the methods of
accounting for pre-production activities. In an attempt to report on this phase of
extractive operations in the most favourable light, the full cost and successful efforts
methods of accounting have developed.1 These two methods of accounting have been
the cause of considerable controversy within the extractive industries due to the
significantly different results generated under each method. First raised in the United
States of America (US) in the 1960s (Van Riper, 1994), the debate over successful
efforts versus full cost accounting has remained unresolved. Companies in the US,
Canada, and the United Kingdom are still able to choose between these two methods
of accounting when reporting on exploration and evaluation activities.
In 1998, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) undertook
to remedy the disparate accounting practices by proposing the development of an
international accounting standard that enhanced comparability and consistency of
financial reporting by extractive industries companies across the world (International
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a). This was to be achieved, in part, by
narrowing accounting alternatives and prescribing a single method of accounting for
exploration and evaluation consistent with the successful efforts concept
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).
The full cost versus successful efforts issue was considered in the IASC’s
Extractive Industries Issues Paper (hereafter referred to as the Issues Paper), published
in November 2000 (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a). The
Issues Paper was the first stage in the process of developing an international
accounting standard for the extractive industries and, as part of the process, was
opened for public comment until June 2001. Comment letters were received from 52
respondents, with many of these from multinational extractive industries companies
and extractive industries lobby groups. While the majority of respondents supported
the proposal to narrow accounting alternatives and require all companies to report
under the successful efforts method, two industry lobby groups vehemently opposed
the proposal and argued that both the successful efforts and full cost methods should
continue to be permitted.
After a series of delays, incorporating the IASC’s restructure and reformation
as the IASB, an international accounting standard for the extractive industries was
finally issued in December 2004 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004c).
However, despite the claimed intentions of narrowing accounting alternatives and
bringing about consistency in extractive industries reporting, in the resultant
accounting standard, the IASB failed to achieve these objectives.
Instead,
International Financial Reporting Standard 6, Exploration for and Evaluation of
Minerals Resources (IFRS 6), granted extractive industries companies an exemption
from the restrictive provisions contained in other international accounting standards.
This had the effect of enabling extractive industries companies to continue to use the
accounting policies in place immediately before the adoption of IFRS 6 to account for
1 The area-of-interest method and appropriation methods are other derivatives of these two main
methods, and are practiced in Australia and South Africa respectively.
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exploration and evaluation expenditure. In sum, IFRS 6 merely codified existing
industry practice, perpetuating the disparate methods of accounting for exploration
and evaluation, and maintaining the status quo for extractive industries companies.
The striking failure of the IASB to follow through with its aim of remedying
the inconsistencies of extractive industries accounting, particularly with respect to the
successful efforts versus full cost issue led to a consideration of the possible factors
that may have influenced this decision. Of interest, therefore, is the story behind the
process of setting the international accounting standard for the extractive industries.
This story cannot be conveyed by a perfunctory analysis of the positions for and
against the IASC/IASB’s proposals and how these might be linked to the outcome of
the process. Rather, it is necessary to consider who took these positions, in addition to
identifying others perhaps less visibly involved, in order to gain insight into how the
accounting standard was developed.
To tell this story, the international accounting standard setting process for the
extractive industries was examined with a view to illuminating the political nature of
accounting, and exposing the underlying institutions and arrangements of accounting.
The presence of power and its effect on the outcome of the international accounting
standard setting process was then explained by using Lukes’ (1974) theory of power.
This theory was used to argue that the role of power in the international accounting
standard setting process is such that the extractive industries have mobilised their
power, captured the IASC/IASB and paralysed the standard setting process in order to
maintain the status quo of flexibility in accounting and financial reporting.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the research approach is
described in the next section and applied to the international accounting standard
setting process for the extractive industries. This is followed by a discussion of power
theory and how it can be used to explain the presence of power in the standard setting
process. Connections between key constituents are then revealed. Finally,
conclusions regarding the presence of power in the international accounting standard
setting process for the extractive industries are presented, along with research
limitations and opportunities for future research.

RESEARCH APPROACH: CRITICALLY EXAMINING
THE PROCESS
As noted, the purpose of this research was to examine the processes that led to the
issue of IFRS 6 and, thereby, the codification of existing disparate extractive
industries accounting practices. International accounting standards are set within an
institutional context that incorporates the IASC/IASB funding arrangements and the
IASC/IASB due process procedures. Within this institutional structure, IASC/IASB
constituents may participate in the standard setting processes. Examining these
constituents and their role is crucial to a critical investigation of international
accounting standard setting process because it enables the researcher to go behind the
scenes of the process to make visible the powerful coalitions and players that
contribute to and influence the process. Importantly, without this deep, multi-layered
analysis, these coalitions and players may otherwise remain masked by the
promulgated transparency and objectivity of the international accounting standard
setting arrangements (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004b).
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THE IASC/IASB FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS
The IASC launched its external funding program in 1990, with revenue received from
three main sources: fees paid by Board members and by the International Federation
of Accountants, profits made on IASC publications, and voluntary contributions made
by companies and other organisations with an interest in the work of the IASC
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 1999). Under these arrangements,
the major international accounting firms were the IASC’s largest source of funding
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 1993).
This funding model was considered to be a considerable threat to the
legitimacy of the international accounting standards because the IASC relied on
voluntary endorsement of, and compliance with, its standards from the same
constituents that were funding its activities. In an attempt to overcome this problem,
the Committee was restructured in 2000 and the International Accounting Standards
Committee Foundation (IASCF) was formed as a not-for-profit entity. A board of
trustees was appointed to the Foundation and charged with the responsibility of
raising funds to support the international accounting standard setting activities
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a). The IASC was renamed the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the trustees also became
responsible for appointing members to the Board and overseeing the IASB’s activities
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a).
Under the new funding arrangements, large multinational corporations, stock
exchanges, national accounting standard setting bodies, central banks, government
entities, international agencies, and international accounting firms became the
benefactors of the IASB (Brown, 2004, International Accounting Standards
Committee Foundation, 2004). The major international accounting firms continued to
be the primary supporters, with each pledging to contribute £1 million per annum to
the IASB, approximately one-third of the IASB’s estimated operating budget. In
2004, the IASB received contributions totalling over £9 million from 184
corporations, associations, and other institutions, including a number of the world’s
leading multinational corporations such as BP plc, Shell International, General
Electric, Pfizer, Vodaphone, and the New York Stock Exchange (International
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2004).
Despite these efforts to improve the actual and perceived transparency of the
external funding program, the arrangements continued to come under attack from
commentators who suggest that there still exists a dependency relationship between
the IASC/IASB and its benefactors, which may influence the issues considered
(Brown, 2004, Mitchell, et al., 1994, Mitchell and Sikka, 1993). For example, it has
been argued that critical issues, such as environmental and social accounting and
accounting for small and medium sized enterprises, are marginalised in favour of
those that align with the political and economic interests of supporters (Brown, 2004).
Brown (2004) further noted that the IASB’s current agenda items, which cover
business combinations, present value, financial instruments, and extractive industries,
are indeed consistent with concerns facing the large, multinational conglomerates that
support the IASB. Mitchell and Sikka (1993, p.29) have similarly argued that the
“institutions and practices of accountancy are collusive and undemocratic” and that
institutions, such as the IASC/IASB, are “dedicated to defending the status quo and
sectional interests rather than wider interests”. A related transparency issue in the
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international accounting standard setting arrangements involves the due process
procedures followed by the IASC/IASB when developing a standard.

THE IASC/IASB DUE PROCESS
The IASC/IASB’s due process procedures were designed to protect the openness,
neutrality, and independence of the accounting standard setting process and enable
arguments for and against proposals to be raised at several points during the
development of a standard (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a). The
due process for the extractive industries accounting standard began in 1998 when the
IASC added the project to its formal agenda. Before considering the due process in
more detail, it is important to note the significance of the agenda setting process itself.
The IASB states that
(b)oard members, members of the Standards Advisory Council, national
standard setters, securities regulators, other organizations and individuals and
the IASB staff are encouraged to submit suggestions for new topics that
might be dealt with in the IASB’s standards (International Accounting
Standards Board, 2004b).

Thus the agenda setting process can be considered an exercise of power in
which certain issues may be “disregarded or suppressed and denied agenda entrance”
(Walker and Robinson, 1993, p.4). In this way, the agenda may be restricted to
relatively safe issues as a result of confining the scope of decision making (Bachrach
and Baratz, 1970, p.43). Further, Cousins and Sikka (1993, p.53) noted that even
once an issue is placed on the formal agenda, it may be that subsequent information,
such as that gathered during the due process, is “controlled by the very people/groups
who are being called to account”. In other words, the “facts” surrounding an issue
may be shaped by the priorities and influence of powerful groups who wish to
maintain the status quo (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.4).
There is no publicly available information regarding how, by whom, or why the
extractive industries project was initiated, however the international prominence,
economic influence, and divergent accounting practices of the extractive industries
were listed as factors contributing to the importance of the project (International
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a). Further, as will be revealed in subsequent
sections, many of the IASC/IASB’s financial underwriters and supporters are
extractive industries enterprises. Thus, following the reasoning of Brown (2004) and
Mitchell and Sikka (1993), it may be argued that the admission of the project to the
IASC’s agenda, at least in part, was a consequence of the relationship between the
IASC and its extractive industries benefactors.
The IASC’s extractive industries project aimed to address accounting
measurement and disclosure issues for the extractive industries, and was led by a
Steering Committee developed specifically for the project (International Accounting
Standards Committee, 2000b).
The Steering Committee was internationally
representative, with members from Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, South
Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America
(US) (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a, Micallef, 2001). The
professional backgrounds of Committee members’ were also varied and included past
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and/or present partners of each of the Big 4 accounting firms, past and/or present
mining and petroleum company executives, academics, and financial analysts.
The Steering Committee reached its first milestone in November 2000, with the
publication of the Extractive Industries Issues Paper. The Issues Paper was a 412
page document consisting of 16 chapters, which raised a number of “Basic Issues”
concerning matters such as reserve estimation and valuation, recognition and
measurement of inventories, and financial statement disclosures. The Issues Paper
was published with an invitation for interested parties to comment by 30 June 2001 on
the matters raised. In addition, given the “widespread interest” in the project, the
Steering Committee also sent the Issues Paper to the “senior financial officers of
nearly 300 extractive industries companies worldwide” with a direct request for
comment (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000b, p.19). To guide
commentators, the Issues Paper set out the Steering Committee’s tentative views on
some of the issues considered most significant. For example, in chapter four of the
Issues Paper, one of the Basic Issues concerned the accounting method to be used by
petroleum enterprises for their financial statements, with the Steering Committee
indicating its preference for a method consistent with the successful efforts concept.
An excerpt from chapter four, shown in Exhibit 1, illustrates this example.
Exhibit 1: Excerpt from chapter four of the Issues Paper
Basic Issue 4.1 - Historical cost concepts for petroleum enterprises
For petroleum enterprises, if one of the historical cost concepts were required for the
primary financial statements, which of the following concepts, broadly defined, should
be adopted? Each of these concepts is interpreted in a variety of ways in practice
today.
a. Accounting standards more consistent with the successful efforts concept than with the
other concepts.
b. Accounting standards more consistent with the area-of-interest concept than with the other
concepts.
c. Accounting standards more consistent with the full cost concept than with the other
concepts.
d. Accounting standards more consistent with the appropriation concept than with the other
concepts.
Steering Committee Tentative View:
For petroleum enterprises, the Steering Committee favours adoption of a method more
consistent with the successful efforts concept than with the other concepts.
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a, p.88)

Respondents to the Issues Paper were required to indicate their preferences on
the Basic Issues raised and thereby indicate their agreement or disagreement with the
Steering Committee’s tentative views.

THE COMMENTS LETTERS
Despite the Steering Committee’s efforts to elicit responses, and the supposed interest
in the project, 52 comment letters were received in respect of the Issues Paper. These
were from respondents in countries including Australia, Canada, China, Germany,
South Africa, the UK, and the US. The principal activities of the respondents were
varied and included mining and petroleum companies, extractive industries lobby
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groups, international accounting firms, professional accounting bodies, standard
setting bodies, and academics. To summarise this information, respondents have been
categorised according to location and into one of the following groups: mining
companies, mining industry lobby groups, petroleum companies, petroleum industry
lobby groups, accounting firms, professional accounting and standard setting
organisations, and others (academics and individuals). Table 1 presents this summary
of the respondents according to location and principal activity.

Location

Table 1: Responses to the Issues Paper, categorised according to location and principal
activity of respondents
Principal activity
Mining
Petroleum
companies and companies and Professional
their
their
accounting and Chartered
representative representative standard setting accounting
groups
groups
organisations
firms
Argentina
1
Australia
8
1
1
Belgium
1
Canada
1
1
China
1
Germany
3
1
International
2
Italy
1
Japan
1
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
1
South Africa
5
1
1
Sweden
1
UK
2
5
3
USA
6
Zimbabwe
1
Total
15
17
13
4

Others
2

1

3

Total
1
12
1
2
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
7
1
10
6
1
52

As shown in Table 1, the majority of comment letters were received from
Australian commentators (21 percent), followed by the UK (19 percent), South Africa
(13 percent), the US (13 percent), Germany (8 percent), and Canada (4 percent).
Petroleum companies and petroleum industry lobby groups were the largest
respondent group (33 percent), followed by mining companies and mining industry
lobby groups (29 percent), professional accounting and standard setting organisations
(25 percent), the Big 4 accounting firms (7 percent), and others (6 percent).
As noted, one of the controversies addressed in the Issues Paper concerned the
method of accounting for pre-production activities. Respondents were asked to
comment on which of the four methods of accounting for pre-production costs should
be adopted by an international accounting standard for the extractive industries (full
cost, successful efforts, area-of-interest, appropriation) (International Accounting
Standards Committee, 2000a). In addition, respondents were to indicate whether they
advocated the use of only one of these methods or whether more than one method
should be permitted. The Steering Committee’s tentative view was that a method
consistent with the successful efforts concept should be adopted and that only this
method of accounting for pre-production costs should be permitted (see Exhibit 1 for
example).
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There was overwhelming support for the use of the successful efforts method
of accounting with 87 percent of respondents commenting on this issue indicating a
preference for the successful efforts method only. Support for the use of the
successful efforts method was hardly surprising, given the desire of the extractive
industries companies to maintain the status quo. In contrast, only 13 percent of
respondents commenting on this issue indicated their support for having the option of
both the successful efforts and full cost methods. Thus, the Steering Committee’s
tentative view on this issue was supported, with the majority of respondents preferring
a single method of accounting for pre-production costs consistent with the successful
efforts concept.
This content-based type of analysis is characteristic of most studies of
accounting standard setting. It is also considered to be preliminary in this research
because it is limited in three respects: First, who is making a particular argument and
what is being said is masked by the aggregation of the responses. Treating
submissions as votes does not take into account the relative power of the respondents
making the submissions, nor does it reflect the decision making processes of the
IASC/IASB, which is arguably more complex than a simple tally of preferences
(Walker and Robinson, 1993). Secondly, the relationships between the respondents
and other key (but perhaps less visible) players in the process remains hidden. Simply
because a company does not respond directly, and therefore publicly, to the
IASC/IASB on a proposed issue does not mean that they have played no part in the
accounting standard setting process (Walker and Robinson, 1993). Thirdly, based on
the preliminary analysis, there appears to be little conflict among respondents and the
IASC. This apparent absence of conflict over the successful efforts and full cost
methods is contrary to the long-standing and intense debate that has surrounded this
issue. As such, it is pertinent closely to examine the responses, and the respondents
and other key players in the extractive industries and the relationship between them.
This is consistent with the second and third dimensions of power theory because it
seeks to reveal how shared meanings may be created between the players and how
this ultimately influences the development of the accounting standard. In the
following section, power theory is discussed before further examining the key players
in the standard setting process for the extractive industries and the overlaps between
them.

POWER THEORY
To explain the presence of power in the international accounting standard setting
process and its effect of the outcome of the IASC/IASB’s extractive industries
project, a Lukes’ (1974) three dimensional view of power was relied upon.

LUKES’ (1974) FIRST DIMENSION OF POWER
Lukes’ (1974) first dimension of power is based on the “pluralist” view of power, so
named because it attempts to demonstrate that power is distributed pluralistically
across many centres of power (Lukes, 1974, p.11). It does not identify a single,
unified power elite, but instead argues that there are many competing interest groups
with differing backgrounds, values, and bases of power. This view of power has been
examined in an accounting context by Kwok and Sharp (2005) who concluded that
the international accounting standard setting process (for segment reporting and
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intangible assets) involved a “mixed power system” (Kwok and Sharp, 2005, p.74)
where no one interest group had control over the process of setting international
accounting standards.
Polsby (1963, p.113) supported the pluralist focus on actual exercises of
power, stressing the need to study specific outcomes in order to “determine who
actually prevails” in decision making. Therefore, pluralists are concerned with the
study of “concrete, observable behaviour” (Lukes, 1974, p.12) “either at first hand or
by reconstructing behaviour from documents, informants, newspapers, and other
appropriate sources” (Polsby, 1963, p.121). The popularity of the pluralist view of
power was aided by the methodological assumptions and research methods of this
approach which were considered to “turn up hard evidence” and provide reliable
conclusions that “met the canons of science” (Lukes, 1974, p.12, Merelman, 1968,
p.451).

LUKES’ (1974) SECOND DIMENSION OF POWER
Lukes (1974, p.20) refers to his second dimension of power as a “qualified critique of
the behavioural focus” of the pluralist view. Critics of the pluralist view argue that its
behavioural focus is a key limitation because an observable conflict of interest must
be present to determine the existence and exercise of power. Bachrach and Baratz
(1962), in their “classical contribution” (Lukes, 1974, p.59) to the power literature,
argued that power in fact has two faces: the first is that advanced by the pluralists, and
termed the one-dimensional view by Lukes (1974), and the second face of power was
developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p.948) who argued that
power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or
reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the
scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues
which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in
doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore
any issues that might in their resolution by seriously detrimental to A’s set of
preferences.

In other words, “to the extent that a person or group – consciously or
unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts,
that person or group has power” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.8). Therefore, an
analysis of two-dimensional power involves examination of both decision making and
non-decision making. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) defined these concepts: a decision
is a “choice among alternative modes of action”, whereas a non-decision “results in
suppression or thwarting of a latent of manifest challenge to the values or interests of
the decision maker” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.35).
To identify non-decisions, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) suggested that the
researcher should begin by analysing the decision making process and determining
the individuals and groups who participated, either directly or indirectly, in the
process of making the decision. Following this, a detailed study of the process should
be conducted to determine the existence of a “mobilisation of bias” and reveal those
players that are favoured in the decision making process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).
With their two faces of power, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) “in effect redefined the
boundaries of what is to count as a political issue” (Lukes, 1974, p.19). While the
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pluralists maintained that a “political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until
it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum” (Dahl,
1961, p.92), the two-dimensional view highlights the importance of identifying
potential issues which are prevented from becoming actual, and those that are silenced
or marginalised by powerful political players (Lukes, 1974).
Despite Lukes’ (1974) commendation of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962, 1963,
1970) contribution to the power literature, he argued that their second face of power
fell victim to the same limitation as that encountered by the pluralists: namely, the
focus on actual, observable conflict, whether it be overt or covert. Like the pluralists,
Bachrach and Baratz (1970, p.49) felt that “if there is no conflict, overt or covert, the
presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in
which case non-decision making is impossible”. Seeking the comfort of empirics,
Bachrach and Baratz (1970, p.50) justified the need for conflict in investigations of
power “to determine empirically whether the consensus is genuine or instead has been
enforced through non-decision making”.

LUKES’ (1974) THIRD DIMENSION OF POWER
In developing his third dimension of power, Lukes (1974) conducted a comprehensive
critique of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962, 1963, 1970) two faces of power. His first
criticism of the two-dimensional view was that it was “still too committed to
behaviourism”, that is the study of overt behaviour in situations of actual conflict
(Lukes, 1974, p.21). Lukes (1974) argued that while decisions may indeed be choices
between alternatives that are consciously and intentionally made by individuals, it was
possible that the bias of the system, the “rules of the game”, may be such that
decisions “are neither consciously chosen nor the intended results of particular
individual’s choices” (Lukes, 1974, p.21). Under this conception, the domination of
power holders may be “so secure and pervasive” that the dominated individuals may
be unaware of any alternative to the existing political system (Lukes, 1974, p.21). In
this way, the rules of the game, that is, the social practices, are
not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most
importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of
groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed by manifested by
individuals’ inaction (Lukes, 1974, p.22).

In his critique of the behavioural focus of the one- and two-dimensional views
of power, Lukes (1974) commented on the limitations of relying on actual conflict to
determine the existence of power. He argued that it is “highly unsatisfactory to
suppose that power is only exercised in situations of conflict” (Lukes, 1974, p.22),
and noted that two types of power, manipulation and authority, may not involve
conflict at all. Lukes (1974, p.23) then proposed his central thesis:
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or
determining his very wants. Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get
another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to
secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?
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Lukes (1974) argued that power, as conceptualised in the one- and twodimensional forms, is assumed to show up only in cases of actual conflict, however
this ignores the crucial and very real possibility that “the most effective and insidious
use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 1974,
p.23). The three-dimensional view of power, therefore, overcomes the limitations of
the one- and two-dimensional views by considering the ways in which potential issues
are excluded from the political process “whether through the operation of social
forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions” (Lukes, 1974,
p.25). It recognises that power need not be empirically verifiable to exist and that the
status quo may need to be questioned in order for the presence of power to be
recognised and illuminated.
Lukes’ (1974) three dimensions of power are
summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: features of Lukes' (1974) three dimensions of power
One-dimensional
view of power
Pluralist

Two-dimensional
view of power
Two faces of power

Type of power:

Exercise of actual
power

Focus on:

Decision making

Exercise of actual
power
Exercise of power by
confining the scope of
decision making
Decision making and
non-decision making

Theoretical view:

Observe power via: Overt conflict

Dahl (1957, 1961),
Key power
Polsby (1963)
theorists:
(Adapted from Lukes, 1974, p.25)

Three-dimensional
view of power
Radical

Exercise of power by
'influencing, shaping
or determining'
perceptions and
preferences
Decision making and
control over political
agenda (not
necessarily through
decisions)
Overt or covert conflict Overt or covert conflict
and latent conflict

Bachrach and Baratz
(1962, 1963, 1970)

Lukes (1974)

This research examines the relationship between the regulator (the
IASC/IASB) and the regulated industry (the extractive industries) and explores the
power plays involved in the international accounting standard setting process for the
extractive industries. The three-dimensional view of power is used to argue the
existence of power and how it has been mobilised by extractive industries constituents
to capture the international accounting standard setting process. The following
section reveals the connections between the key players in the international
accounting standard setting process.

MAKING CONNECTIONS
Table 1 summarised the raw demographic data obtained from the comment letters
submitted in response to the Issues Paper. Analysis of these responses showed that
the majority of respondents agreed with the Steering Committee’s proposal to
mandate the use of the successful efforts method only when accounting for preproduction activities. This analysis, although relatively superficial, is useful for
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summarising responses and as a starting point for subsequent investigations of power.
To conduct these investigations, closer examination of the respondents was
undertaken and revealed a number of overlapping interests between the key players.
The overlaps have been categorised in terms of funding, representation, and
relationships and are portrayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Overlaps between IASC/IASB, the Big 4, extractive industries companies,
and industry lobby groups

IASC/IASB
financial
contribution

IASC/IASB financial contribution

IASC/IASB

Big 4

Extractive industries companies

IASC/IASB representation

Big 4

Representation for extractive industries
companies and other members

Extractive industries companies

IASC/IASB
representation

Representation for extractive industries
companies and other members

Extractive industries lobby groups

Extractive industries lobby groups

At the centre of these overlaps is the IASC/IASB. Overlaps exist between the
IASC/IASB and other key players due to the funding arrangements of the IASC/IASB
and key players’ representation on the boards and committees of the IASC/IASB.
The Big 4 accounting firms are portrayed as the first layer of overlap because of the
substantial financial contribution made by these firms to the IASC/IASB and the high
level of representation of the Big 4 on the boards and committees of the IASC/IASB.
Following the Big 4 are extractive industries companies, which overlap with the Big 4
in terms of auditor/client relationships and with the IASC/IASB in terms of funding
and representation. The third layer comprises the industry lobby groups which
represent the interests of members (which includes extractive industries companies
and the Big 4) when liaising with the IASC/IASB.
Figure 2 extends Figure 1 by incorporating details of the constituents involved
in the international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries
and their overlapping interests.
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As shown in Figure 2, the overlapping interests between the IASC/IASB and
the Big 4 are summarised in terms of financial support, representation, association
with other key players, and the response to the Issues Paper and successful efforts
versus full cost issue. Ernst & Young was the only one of the Big 4 not to make a
formal response to the Issues Paper. PwC and Deloitte responded with a preference
for a single method of accounting consistent with the successful efforts concept, while
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IP: SE only: response to Issues Paper indicated preference for successful efforts method only
IP: SE & FC: response to Issues Paper indicated preference for successful efforts and full cost methods
Note: the Group of 100 was inferred to be representing the Australian mining industry, however it was not included in this Figure because its membership cannot be verified.

A: Association with other key players

£1m p.a.: Financial contribution of £1 million per annum
U: Underwriter contributing between 100,000 and 200,000 pounds per annum
S: Supporter contributing an undisclosed amount per annum
R: Represented on the Steering Committee and/or IASCF and/or IASB and/or IFRIC and/or SAC

American Petroleum Insitute (IP: SE & FC)
Oil Industry Accounting Committee (IP: SE & FC)
Kerr-McGee Ltd
TOTAL
BHP Billiton
BP plc
BP plc
Kerr-McGee Ltd
TOTAL
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
ChevronTexaco
ConocoPhillips
Paladin Resources
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
Big 4 accounting firms
Esso Imperial Oil
ExxonMobil
BHP Billiton (S, R, A, IP: SE only)
BG plc (S)
Total (U)
Deutsche Bank (S, A)
Sasol Mining Ltd (IP: SE only)
Chevron (S)
Commerzbank (S, R)
Enterprise Oil (A, IP: SE only)
Royal Dutch/Shell Group (U, R, A)
ABN Amro (S)
E.ON AG (U)
ENI (S, R, IP: SE only)
AngloGold Ltd (S, R, A, IP: SE only)
BP plc (U, A)
Esso Imperial Oil (S, A, IP: SE only)
KPMG (£1m p.a., R, A, IP: SE & FC,
ExxonMobil (S, A, IP: SE only)
Cairn Energy
AGC, MCA, OIAC)
Conoco Inc (S, IP: SE only)
Gold Fields Ltd (IP: SE only)
Ernst & Young
PwC (£1m p.a.,
Kerr-McGee Ltd (IP: SE & FC)
Goldfields Ltd (S, A, IP: SE only)
(£1m p.a., R, A,
R, A, IP: SE only,
AGC, MCA,
AGC, MCA,
IASC/IASB
Petrochina (S, A, IP: SE only)
Newcrest Mining Ltd
OIAC)
OIAC)
Rio Tinto (S, IP: SE only)
Northern Gold NL
Paladin Resources (IP: SE & FC)
Royal Dutch/Shell Group (U, R, A)
Petroleo Brasileiro (S)
RWE AG (U, R, A, IP: SE only)
Deloitte (£1m p.a., R, A, IP: SE only,
Placer Dome (A)
RWE DEA (U, R, A, IP: SE only)
AGC, MCA, OIAC)
RWE Rheinbraun (U, R, A, IP: SE only)
Total (U)
Woodside Petroleum (IP: SE only)
Iluka Resources
Newmont Mining Ltd (A)
Normandy (IP: SE only)
Anglo American plc (S, R, A, IP: SE only)
Anglo American Platinum Corp Ltd (S, R, A, IP: SE only)
Australian Gold Council (IP: no direct comment)
Minerals Council of Australia (IP: SE only)
South African Chamber of Mines (IP: SE only)
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Anglo Group
Anglo Group
BHP Billiton
Anglo Group BHP Billiton
Big 4
Deutsche Bank
Big 4
Iluka Resources
Placer Dome
Gold Fields Ltd
Goldfields Ltd
Newcrest Mining Ltd Newmont Mining Ltd
Newcrest Mining Ltd
Northern Gold NL
Placer Dome
Rio Tinto
Newmont Mining Ltd
Placer Dome

Figure 2: Overlaps between the IASC/IASB, the Big 4, extractive industries companies, and industry lobby groups

KPMG also advocated the use of the successful efforts method but was cognisant of
the value of the full cost to smaller exploration companies. The financial and
personnel relationships between the IASC/IASB and the Big 4 are undeniable,
however, as well as providing financial, personnel, and technical support, the Big 4
firms serve an important liaison function between the IASB and their clients. For
example, at least one of the Big 4 have a focus group, comprising representatives of
its extractive industries based clients, which meets monthly to discuss issues arising
from IASB developments, provide training on the implementation of IASB
pronouncements, and formulate responses to IASB proposals (Personal
communication, 2004). Georgiou (2004) provided evidence that a considerable
number of companies lobby the IASB through their external auditor thus requiring
extensive consultation between auditor and client in order to ensure that client
interests are accurately represented. Ryan et al. (1999, p.177) also noted the tendency
of auditors to “adopt the position of their clients” when participating in the accounting
standard setting process.
Given the relationship between the IASC/IASB and the Big 4, and the Big 4
and their clients, an indirect relationship is established between the IASC/IASB and
the major corporations, creating another layer of influence between the IASC/IASB,
the Big 4, and the major corporations. This influence is heightened by the direct
relationship between some of these companies and the IASC/IASB in terms of
financial support and/or representation, shown as the second layer in Figure 2.
The second layer presents details of the overlaps between extractive industries
companies and the IASC/IASB. These extractive industries companies are grouped
according to their external auditor (that is, one or more of the Big 4) to highlight the
intricacy of the relationships between the key players in the standard setting process.
The characteristics of the relationship between the companies and the IASC/IASB is
summarised according to the nature of the financial contributions (if any) made to the
IASC/IASB, the representation of the companies (if any) on the boards and
committees of the IASC/IASB, and the public position (if any) taken by the company
in respect of the full cost versus successful efforts issue. Also indicated is whether the
company has significant associations with other key players in the process (denoted
by “A” in Figure 2). Many of the key extractive industries companies identified in the
second layer also have associations with industry lobby groups, which represent the
third layer of overlapping interests.
As shown in Figure 2, the third layer comprises the extractive industries lobby
groups that participated in the international accounting standard setting process. The
extractive industries companies that are represented by these coalitions have been
listed according to the lobby group that represents them. These lobby groups are
powerful coalitions of extractive industries companies that together represent a
formidable force against the IASC/IASB. The American Petroleum Institute (API)’s
membership list, for example, includes six of the world’s top twelve companies that
together earned revenues in excess of US$1.2 trillion during 2005. The Oil Industry
Accounting Committee (OIAC)’s membership list was more elusive than the API’s,
however the members that could be discerned were equally impressive and also
included each of the Big 4. In their responses to the IASC in respect of the Issues
Paper, both the API and the OIAC argued strongly for the retention of the full cost
and successful efforts methods of accounting.
Interestingly, while some of the members of these coalitions individually
responded to the Issues Paper and commented that they agreed with the IASC’s
proposal to eliminate the full cost method, they were also likely to be instrumental to
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the development of the policy positions taken by the lobby groups that represented
them. For example, the Exxon Group submitted an independent comment letter in
response to the Issues Paper that supported the requirement of a single method of
accounting for exploration and evaluation consistent with the successful efforts
method. However, the API’s comment letter was vehemently opposed to the
elimination of the full cost method. It is highly likely the Exxon Group, as the largest
and most powerful member of the coalition, was consulted by the API on this matter.
Another example is the position taken by the OIAC and those taken by the Big 4,
which are also members of the OIAC. While PwC and Deloitte indicated their
support for the IASC’s proposal to require only the successful efforts method, the
OIAC strongly opposed this proposal. However, the collaboration of the OIAC’s
members in developing the position taken by the Committee must have been
substantial given that KPMG’s response to the IASC was identical to that submitted
by the OIAC.
This analysis of the layers of respondents to the Issues Paper has further
highlighted the complexity and intricacy of the overlaps between key players in the
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries.
Conclusions are presented in the following section, including limitations of the study
and opportunities for future research.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented the results of a critical examination of the
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries,
undertaken to reveal the underlying practices and institutions of accounting, and
illuminate the political, economic, and social influences that shaped the standard
setting process and the resultant accounting standards.
The IASC/IASB’s extractive industries project was commenced in 1998, with
the objective of enhancing comparability and consistency of extractive industries
accounting and financial reporting. Issued in December 2004, the outcome of the
IASC/IASB’s project so far, IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral
Assets, is simply a codification of existing industry practice. This has resulted in a
perpetuation of the disparate accounting and financial reporting endemic to the
extractive industries. In other words, despite all of the time, money, and other
resources expended to eliminate divergent accounting practices within the extractive
industries, nothing has changed. The IASB has stressed that IFRS 6 is an interim
measure pending further consultation with the extractive industries, however the most
recent board discussion on the extractive industries research project was an IASB
Education Session held on 16 October 2006, with subsequent discussion papers based
on this meeting not expected before mid 2007 (International Accounting Standards
Board, 2006b).
The failure of the IASC/IASB to minimise alternative accounting practices for
the extractive industries was determined to be worthy of further study, in particular
the role of power in this process. In this context, this research demonstrates that
power was exercised via a system of intricate, overlapping interests. The extractive
industries, as a collective community of interests, mobilised their power, ensuring that
the IASC/IASB’s processes, agenda, and discourses were influenced in a way
favourable to them. In this way, the IASC/IASB was predisposed to take actions
consistent with the preferences of these constituents, so that there was no evidence of
coercion or conflict. This led to the preservation of the existing flexibility and
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enabled extractive industries companies to continue to choose between methods of
accounting for exploration and evaluation. The status quo was the desired outcome
for the extractive industries, despite the extensive processes of the IASC/IASB.

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
The identification of lobbying activity is perhaps more akin to pluralist studies of
power than the three dimensional view, given that it is an overt behaviour. In
addition, lobbying activity may occur relatively late in the process of setting
accounting standards compared to agenda setting and formulation of proposals.
However, to compensate for these limitations, lobbying activity was used in this
research primarily as a starting point for the identification of key players. This
formed the basis for detection of the linkages and connections between players.
The official due process of the IASC/IASB is reasonably transparent, with
information concerning committees, boards, and participants made publicly available.
However, the agenda setting process is significantly less transparent and the absence
of publicly available information concerning the inner workings of this process is a
limitation of this research. The setting of the agenda may itself involve elements of
power as issues are “disregarded, suppressed, or denied agenda entrance” (Walker and
Robinson, 1993, p.4) by powerful participants (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963,
Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, Lukes, 1974, Mitnick, 1980). Unlike Walker’s (1987)
study, this research was not conducted inside the process and therefore intimate
complex nuances are not identified. This research instead places more reliance on the
role of theory to unmask the presence and role of powerful interest groups. Given that
this was an analysis of prior events, and there was limited access, publicly available
information was considered the most effective means of gathering evidence for the
presence of power in the international accounting standard setting process for the
extractive industries.

FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
One opportunity for future research in this are relates to the methods used to collect
data to support the research question. Although publicly available information has the
advantage of offering relatively unproblematic access, a participant observer may be
able to add valuable insights to the research findings. The main obstacles to
participant observation would undoubtedly be gaining access to the IASC/IASB’s
processes and/or constituents, particularly given the sensitive nature of the research
issues.
The theoretical framework developed in this research can be applied to other
studies of international accounting standard setting projects. For example, a similar
study of the IASB’s financial instruments project would be an interesting and valuable
addition to extant research, particularly given the controversy generated by the project
and the high profile players with an interest in the project, such as the World Bank,
J.P. Morgan Chase, Allianz, the European Central Bank, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2006).
Other aspects of the extractive industries project may also be explored using
the research approach and theoretical framework developed in this research. A
pertinent and timely issue for the extractive industries concerns accounting for
removal and restoration expenses, which is an area of substantial accounting
flexibility. This area is also likely to be of interest to many and varied stakeholder
18

groups including extractive industries companies, environmental groups, and nongovernment organisations.
The purpose of this research has been to consider the role of power in the
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries and how
it has been mobilised by extractive industries constituents. A framework has been
considered that enables the identification of a powerful community of interests within
the extractive industries, which has paralysed the standard setting body under which it
operates.
While the politicisation of accounting standard setting is widely
acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant groups can covertly wield
such power is a sobering one in the light of the worldwide promotion and adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards.
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